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**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET** SUBJECT: (Optional) Weekly Staff Notes FROM: EXTENSION Plans Branch/PPS Office of Security DATE 28 April 1986 TO: (Officer designation, room number, and DATE OFFICER'S building) to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) RECEIVED **FORWARDED** ١. C/Plans Branch 2. C/PPS 3. EO/OS 4. 5. 6. 7. **PRIORITY** 9. Form No. 160 Use Previous Editions (13)10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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28 April 1986

	1. DD/PS ANNOUNCES RETIREMENT
25 <b>X</b> 1	DD/PS, announced his forthcoming
25 <b>X</b> 1	retirement effective 3 June 1986. urged everyone in the field to continue their support to the Director and he wished everyone well.
25X1	responded by expressing his personal regret at
25X1	announced retirement. He referred to
25 <b>X</b> 1	as the quiding hand, keeping the Office out of trouble.  described him as the hallmark of support since his own arrival in September 1985.
	2. SENIOR AGENCY PERSONNEL CHANGES
25 <b>X</b> 1	Based on a recent DDA staff meeting, provided the following comments on the changing of senior personnel and their perceived operating styles.
	(DDCI)
25X1	Mr. Gates has stated his concern for and desire to alter present budget procedures
25X1	He also feels the Agency should not be required to take a proportionate Gramm-Rudman cut as has been the case with DOD and he will testify before the Armed Services Committee in this regard.
	While State Department has lead responsibility in reducing U.S. presence overseas as a result of the terrorist threat, Mr. Gates has stated that the Agency will review its own
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25X1 25X1	overseas presence and will reduce accordingly.
25X1	Mr. Gates further advised that he views the DCI as the company president, i.e., not being involved in the day-to-day problems affecting the Agency. Mr. Gates sees himself as the company executive officer and has established an executive staff, appointing as the chief. Two positions on the staff, not yet filled, will be designated as special assistants selected from the DO and the DI. The executive staff will be the focal point for various activities to include critical intelligence assessments, policy papers, and Congressional testimonies. Additional functions of the staff are to be determined.
	(DDA)
25X1	An intense one-on-one meeting with the recently appointed DDA, William F. Donnelly, is scheduled for 30 April to discuss with D/OS such topics as career development, polygraph, and technical security issues. announced that Mr. Donnelly prefers cross-Office issues to be discussed with, and in the presence of, all Office directors involved. These meetings will replace the DDA Quarterly Reviews, which have been cancelled.
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5. SPO P	ROGRAM
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expressed his interest in developing a mature career service for the Security Protective Officers (SPOs). He is concerned about the current attrition rate. The recommendations have been made to, and accepted by, the DDA to prioritize the SPO applicant processing, to extend the minimum tour from 12 to 18 months and to provide a \$1,000 incentive for current SPO's who sign up for an additional year.

## 6. TERRORIST THREAT-DOMESTIC ENHANCEMENTS

As a result of the terrorist threat throughout the world, OS is moving quickly to build an in-house capability to counter the terrorist threat domestically. It is hoped that the Office will ultimately be able to respond to a terrorist attack within the first 10 minutes and take control of the incident without relying on outside assistance. This will require additional training for the SPOs and acquisition of the appropriate equipment.

## 7. SHULTZ BRIEFING

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As previously reported, accompanied by the DCI and Deputy Chief, Polygraph Division, briefed Secretary Shultz on the Agency's Polygraph Program. ppined the briefing went well and that Secretary Shultz took from the briefing two very important aspects about the Program: (1) security disapprovals are based on polygraph-derived information and not solely on chart readings, and (2) the Program has been grossly misrepresented over the years.

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